Croatian Information Service, 1978

Background: Croatian Nationalism in the Twentieth Century.

Perhaps the "father" of modern Croatian nationalism was Dr. Ante Starcevic, a Zagreb lawyer who died in 1886. By the end of the nineteenth century his Party of Rights, founded in 1878, had become the most active and influential of all Croatian political parties. Starcevic's calls for complete independence led to a revolt by Eugen Kvaternik who died for that cause.

Croatia briefly declared its independence in 1918 only to be swallowed by the Kingdom of Serbia in less than a month. Antagonism between Croatians of the Roman Catholic faith and those of the Serbian Orthodox persuasion had been an internal problem in Croatia for over two centuries. Those of the Orthodox faith considered themselves to be Serbians, regardless of their ethnic background, and soon the Catholic and Muslim Croatians came to regard them as Serbians also. With the advent of a Serbian-ruled Yugoslav state, many of the Orthodox Croatians came to regard themselves as members of the ruling nation within the state.

In fact, the Orthodox throughout Yugoslavia were encouraged in this belief by the Serbian chauvinist or "Great Serbian" governments of King Alexander. All important governmental and military posts were reserved exclusively for "Serbs," or those of the Orthodox faith, and many Roman Catholics converted to Orthodoxy in order to gain acceptance by government officials and to obtain good paying positions.

The Croatians, most of whom had never accepted the formation of the Yugoslav state anyway, were soon in political and often physical revolt. In 1921 the Croatian representatives to Parliament, along with the Slovenes, withdrew from that body in protest of the virtual Serbian dictatorship. They declared the constitution forced upon them by the Serbians to be null and void. The leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, at that time the most Powerful in Croatia, went abroad to seek support for the Croatian people. He returned without that support and attempted a settlement through negotiation. In 1925 the Peasant leader, Stjepan Radic, entered the government in Belgrade and recognized the Karadjordevic dynasty. As a pacifist he called upon the Croatian people to settle their differences with the Serbian ruling class through parliamentary procedures. On June 20, 1928, Radic, along with Croatian representatives Djuro Basaricek, Paul Radic and two others, was gunned down by a Serbian Deputy on the floor of the Parliament. Paul Radic and Djuro Basaricek were killed outright; Stephen Radic died on August 8. Within months King Alexander dissolved all political parties, abolished all basic freedoms and human rights and openly proclaimed himself dictator of Yugoslavia.

The Croatian nation was divided into artificial administrative units, thousands of political leaders, including Dr. Vlatko Macek, successor to Stjepan Radic, were arrested and many, including the famous scholar Milan Sufflay, were murdered. Those who survived the initial wave of terror fled Yugoslavia. Among them was Dr. Ante Pavelic, Deputy from the city of Zagreb and vice-president of the Bar Association. He formed a revolutionary organization known as the Ustase ("Uprisers") Movement and promised to liberate Croatia by whatever means necessary. He was immediately sentenced to death for his "anti-State" pronouncements.

The cause of Croatian nationalism took on a dual complexion at this time. Those who followed Ante Pavelic and his Ustase movement, primarily from the Dinaric area of Croatia, felt that only violence and mass uprising could free their nation from the Alexandrian dictatorship. Others, primarily those of agrarian background, led by the Croatian Peasant Party, continued to offer organized resistance in the form of non-cooperation and civil disobedience, avoiding violence when at all possible. The Ustase, by their nature and condemnation were forced to work from outside the country, finding friends in Yugoslavia's enemies, Italy and Hungary.

While the Peasant Party sought some concessions from the royalist government within the country, the Ustase began an active campaign of national liberation through their revolutionary underground. Assassinations, bombings, and even an armed revolt in the Lika area were carried out by the Ustase movement. The Belgrade government reacted by jailing some 20,000 Croatians, most of whom were not Ustase. Finally, in October 1934, a member of the Macedonian Liberation Movement succeeded in assassinating Alexander during a state visit to France.

After Alexander's death, Prince Paul, a cousin of Alexander, sought to reach an understanding with Italy which led to a relaxed policy toward the Ustase and eventually toward Croatia as a whole. A number of Ustase leaders returned from exile to strengthen their underground membership. Soon the Yugoslav army and navy had Ustase agents in many positions including some ranking officers.

The Peasant movement continued along non-violent lines but became more militant and powerful. By the end of 1938 it became obvious to the Yugoslav leadership that they must reach agreements with their fascist neighbors as well as with the Croatians. In 1939 an agreement was signed creating a semi-autonomous "Banovina" of Croatia tied to Yugoslavia only by a common crown, mutual postal system, foreign affairs ministry and military establishment. The Croatians considered the agreement to be a first step toward total freedom; the Serbs viewed it as the greatest liberty the Croatians would ever be allowed and as a temporary political necessity. At the same time, the Yugoslav government moved closer and closer to the Axis which it formally joined in March 1941.

A revolt among Serbian officers in Belgrade led Hitler to believe that Yugoslavia had repudiated its Axis membership. At least this is the view of a number of historians. Evidence now shows that the Serbian officers had no intention of leaving the Axis, but rather revolted against the freedom given the Croatians in the agreement of 1939. If this was the case, it is likely that Hitler knew the true nature of the coup. Even so, he could not afford to have turmoil on his southern flank just prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union and needed to quickly finish the disaster that Mussolini had created in Greece. Hitler therefore ordered the rapid and unmerciful conquest of Yugoslavia in early April 1941. The Yugoslav Army fell apart at the first sign of the German war machine; as did the government. The Croatians and other minorities refused to fight for their former masters and the bulk of the Serbian forces withdrew to Serbia, leaving the Croatians to fend for themselves. In most cases, the Germans were welcomed as liberators in Croatia.

The underground Ustase took advantage of the confusion to take over most cities even before the Germans arrived. On April 10, 1941, the Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed. The Germans and Italians did not approve of the formation of such a state; Italy wanting all of the coastal region of Dalmatia for herself and Germany content to give the whole nation to Hungary. Faced with an established fact, the Axis partners allowed Croatia to remain after Italy and Hungary had taken large parts of the national territory and Italy and Germany had divided the state into two occupation zones. The Croatian State was never fully able to establish itself as a national government in much of the territory due to German and Italian influence and occupation.

As if the young state were not already doomed, the Royal Serbian Cetniks and fugitive members of the former Royal Army, immediately launched a campaign of terror against the Croatian people under the guise of "liberation" for Yugoslavia. They were soon joined by the communist Partisans led by Marshal Josip Broz Tito who at first cooperated with, but later turned against the Cetniks. The result was one of the bloodiest civil wars in history although none called it a civil war. For the Croatian State, it was a war of survival against the Partisans and Cetniks; for the Cetniks it was "resistance"; and for the Germans it was "revolt". The Italians sought to play all sides against one another, at times supporting each of the elements involved and on other occasions opposing each. Needless to say, the Italians were the first "out" of the war, although it must be noted that they lost fewer lives than any of the other parties involved and somehow managed to end the war on the winning side.

The Croatians were less fortunate. As the war neared its conclusion, the Partisan armies, now with the complete support of the Allies, emerged victorious. The Croatian State was destroyed; her leaders fled or were hung by the victors; and hundreds of thousands of Croatians who had in one way or another supported the Croatian State, if only as a private in the army, were executed or sentenced to long terms of prison and forced labor. The victorious communists set out within days of taking control to break the very soul of Croatian nationalism once and for all. They were not to succeed

The Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia was an outgrowth of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) which formed a government on November 29, 1943 with 142 delegates in congress at the second session of the AVNOJ. From that date until January 31, 1946 when the first constitution was framed, the country was politically ruled by a "revolutionary government."

The revolutionary government had nothing of a "Yugoslav" character to distinguish it from any other communist government of the time. It was, in fact, based entirely on the Soviet model and Tito sought to imitate Stalin. In his book Conversations with Stalin, former communist Vice-Premier Milovan Djilas noted that: "The Yugoslav Communist Party was not only as ideologically unified as the Soviet, but faithfulness to Soviet leadership was one of the essential elements of its development and its activity. Stalin was not only the undisputed leader of genius, he was the incarnation of the very idea and dream of the new society."

The combination of an avowed Stalinist attitude within the Yugoslav communist leadership with a near anarchy situation in the countryside led to a radical solution to the problem of Croatian nationalism in the form of genocide. The long chain of massacres initiated by the Partisans in the months after their Soviet-backed victory has come to be known as the Bleiburg Tragedy. Bleiburg, Austria is symbolic as the point from which thousands of Croatians were forced to return from Austria to the "New Yugoslavia". From this Austrian village hundreds of thousands of Croatians were marched to their deaths in locations throughout western Yugoslavia, especially Maribor (40,000 victims), Kocevje (30,000), St. Vid (20,000) and Huda Luknja (16,000). Although the figure 150,000 is often used to describe the number of deaths directly linked to Bleiburg, the total number of Croatians, soldiers and civilians, murdered during the period immediately after the war's end may never be known.

In addition to outright murder, which by its nature is difficult to document, there were "trials" which had at least some air of legality about them. Every member of the war-time Croatian government was found guilty of "war crimes." Those who had not escaped, the majority, were hung. "People's tribunals" passed judgment on thousands of minor officials, civil servants and soldiers. Even those who were conscripted into service, were found guilty of "collaboration." Officers of the Ustase Militia were, as a rule, hung. Those regular officers and enlisted men who had joined the army of their own free will, although many had done so to avoid conscription by the German Army, were usually sentenced to terms of seven to twelve years at hard labor. Draftees and members of the State Labor Service (D.R.S.) were given lighter sentences. How many thousands died in forced labor will never be known. The workings of the "People's Courts" were uncomplicated and to the point as explained by the Commissar for Justice in 1944:

"In our peoples courts, the procedure is simple, short and quick, with no delays oral or direct."

As the cornerstone of the Croatian nation, the Roman Catholic Church was singled out for particular abuse during the first months of the new "People's Order." On May 17, 1945, only days after the communist take-over, Archbishop Stepinac of Zagreb was arrested and detained for several days. By the middle of summer, commissars had been assigned to oversee the administration of all schools and religious foundations. By September the anti-church campaign was in full swing. All Catholic presses had been silenced, schools had been closed, and the bishops of Croatia reported 243 clergy, 19 seminarians and three lay brothers dead, 169 priests in prison and 89 missing at the hands of the Partisan government.

Although technically free, Stepinac was followed carefully by the OZNA (Yugoslav Secret Police) and well prepared media campaign was presented against him. On September 9, 1946 twelve priests were brought to trial in Zagreb for "collaboration." The press cried out for the arrest of the "leader of the gang" Stepinac.

At six a.m. on September 18, 1946, Archbishop Stepinac was arrested. He was indicted on the 23rd, given the indictment on the 24th and put on trial on the 30th. From the time of his arrest until his conviction on October 11th, the Archbishop was allowed to speak with his counsel once, for one hour on September 27. The "trial" included the usual trappings of communist shows trials including "mass demonstrations" by the "enraged masses" inside the courtroom, violent speeches by both the prosecutor and the judge and unlimited prosecution witnesses. The defense was allowed to call twenty witnesses, fourteen of whom were disqualified by the judge. By actual count, the prosecution was allowed forty-eight hours of testimony while the defense had twenty minutes.

Finally, on October 3,1946, Stepinac was allowed to speak in his own defense. His speech became famous throughout the world as a symbol of resistance to communism just as his sermons during the war made him an inspiration to anti-Nazis throughout the world. One sentence summarily captures the tone and content of the archbishops reply:

"For my convictions I am able to bear not only ridicule, hatred, and humiliation, but—because my conscience is clear—I am ready at any moment to die."

On October 11,1946 the "trial" ended with a sentence of sixteen years at hard labor. Five other defendants were given terms of twelve years to death by hanging. Stepinac was appointed a Cardinal on January 12, 1953 and died, still under house arrest, on February 10, 1960. Although no authoritative study has been made to date, it has been estimated that some three hundred members of the Muslim clergy in Bosnia and Hercegovina were also liquidated by the Partisans during the immediate post-war period.

When the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was formed In 1918, the Croatians were presented with a national debt of nearly twenty-two billion dinars. Over 20 billion dinars or 93.5% of that national debt was Serbian. Those debts were paid primarily by the Croatian people. One of the methods of enriching the Serbian crown was an unfair exchange rate which allowed Serbs to exchange their Serbian Dinars at par for Yugoslav Dinars. The Croatians were allowed to exchange their Austrian Krunas, which had buying power equal to or in excess of the dinar, at a rate of four Krunas per Dinar. The Croatians thus lost about 1.4 billion dinars in purchasing power, while the crown gained millions in much needed Austrian currency.

This pattern did not change in the post-World War II period. During the war the Croatian State circulated Kunas which in 1941 had a value of two cents and were exchanged at par for Royal Yugoslav Dinars. The Serbian regime circulated War Dinars which were also exchanged at par. During the conflict both currencies were subjected to massive inflation but both had about the same purchasing power in 1945. The People's government decreed in 1945 that the Kuna would be exchanged for the new communist dinar at a rate of seven Dinars per one thousand Kuna and that one could exchange no more than 500,000 Kuna for a total of 3,500 Dinars. The result was that any person holding more than 500,000 Kunas lost anything over that amount. The Serbs were allowed to exchange an unlimited number of War Dinars at a rate of fifty Dinars per thousand War Dinars.

The result of this exchange was the most Croatians were poor, with little of the new currency, while most Serbs were wealthy by comparison. People and companies flocked to Croatia from Serbia where they purchased every sort of consumer goods, jewelry, and machinery for Serbia. At the same time, the Croatians were forced to sell most of their property in order to gain enough of the new currency to live.

Although the economic exploitation that took place as a result of this unfair currency exchange was massive, it paled in the light of the outright seizure of property by the State. Croatian factories were gutted, printing presses and laboratories were removed to Serbia. Large numbers of ships, fishing boats, and passenger liners were taken from their Croatian owners and removed to Montenegro. When little or nothing was left to exploit in Croatia, a tax system was established which forced Croatia to turn over 70.5% of her total revenue to Belgrade while Serbia contributed only 51.7%. Such exploitation left Croatia with one of the lowest standards of living in Europe during the immediate post-war period. In his book Yugoslavia Today, John Pintos noted: "The monthly wages of a qualified civil servant are about 5,000 or 6,000 dinars. An industrial worker earns about 200 dinars daily, and an agricultural worker from 100-150 dinars. Yet a kilo of coffee costs 4,000 dinars, a kilo of rice 600 dinars, a pair of bad shoes from 6,000... (one) has to work an entire month without food to be in a position to buy one and a half kilo of coffee, a pair of shoes or ten kilos of rice. To buy a second-class suit he must work four or five months. If he wants to buy 50 pieces of toilet soap he must not eat for one month."

The federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia gained its first constitution in January 1946. The 139 article document, a copy of the Soviet Stalinist constitution, contained all of the "freedoms" and guarantees found in every constitution born of "People's democracies." The preamble stated that the Constituent Assembly expressed the "...unanimous will of all the peoples of the FPRY."

The first signer of the document was Josip Broz Tito. Less noticed was the signature appearing nineteenth on the list, Aleksandar Rankovic, future head of the dreaded UDBA or Secret Police. Also signing was Milovan Djilas, a ranking communist and member of the Presidium. Djilas would denounce the document and the government it created only seven years later. Rankovic would use such provisions as Article 43 to keep Djilas and thousands of other "anti-state elements" behind bars for most of their lives.

Tito was willing to follow Stalinism, but not Stalin. One sin Tito committed was to send his own secret police (UDBA) after Stalin's secret police operating inside Yugoslavia. On June 28, 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform. Tito found his state in serious financial straits and with few friends in the world. The United States had been somewhat cool toward Tito due to his policy of shooting down U.S. relief planes bringing aid to Yugoslavia.

The break led to a new series of arrests and purges as the "Cominformists," who had been active in liquidating the "nationalists" in 1945, were themselves sent to the prisons of the Department of State Security. The rigid five-year plan was abandoned, the economic system in the factories was changed and forced collectivism was given up. The peasants were allowed to leave the farms, and they did so in great numbers. The Stalinist constitution of 1946 was modified in 1953 and the battle for the correct "road to socialism" between the Soviet Union and Tito's Yugoslavia began to take shape.

The opportunity to step into the middle of such a dispute between communists proved too great a temptation for the United States as a massive aid program began. In spite of open hostility toward the United States government, the American taxpayer continued to support the Tito regime to the tune of over four billion dollars. Per capita, Yugoslavia is one of the greatest recipients of American economic and military aid.

American aid did not, however, change the communist nature of the Tito government or the anti-Croatian bent of the centralized Yugoslav State. Soon after Stalin's death, a new Yugoslav-Soviet "understanding" was reached and in June 1955 Khrushchev and Bulganin came to Belgrade to pay tribute to Marshal Tito. By 1956 Tito was again welcomed in Moscow as a hero and friend of the Soviets. A so-called "Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute" took place in the summer of 1958 but it took the form of a multiple exchange of bitter notes and press attacks rather than anything like the formal split of 1948.

Tito continued to cultivate his ties with the Soviet Bloc while pretending to be a leader of the "neutral" world. In September 1960, Tito played host to twenty-five "non-aligned" nations at a conference held in Belgrade. The tone of the conference was openly anti-American. A New York Times report noted that Tito was taking a "neutral" road toward Moscow. He has remained on that path growing closer and closer to Moscow every year. In 1977 Tito was awarded the Soviet Order of the October Revolution to crown his laurels and make know to the world his value to the Soviet state.

The international status of Marshal Tito meant little to the thousands of Croatians who were languishing in Yugoslav jails and prison camps. During the early 1950's the first of the World War II "criminals" began to emerge from the "UDBA Archipelago." Some returned to their homes, but many fled to the West. Joining those who had escaped in 1945. These emigres would form the backbone of Croatian nationalism during the immediate post-war period and have a lasting influence well into the 1970s.

Although the period from 1956 through 1966 saw less of the outright cultural genocide of the early post-war years, the persecution of the Croatians did not end. Economic exploitation became more severe as billions of dinars were taken from Croatia to support the poorer "republics." Croatians, though well educated and highly trained, often could not find jobs and were forced to leave their homeland for western Europe, Australia, or North America to earn a living. At first, they left illegally and often lost all of their personal property as a result. Later the Yugoslav government lifted travel restrictions in order to encourage more Croatians to leave the country. Tito knew that those who left would usually send money back to their families; hard currency which Yugoslavia could and did tax heavily. Today, it would not be an overstatement to say that millions of Croatians in Yugoslavia are supported by Croatians who have emigrated to the West or who serve as "guest workers" in western Europe.

A "watering down" of the Croatian nation also took place during this period as hundreds of thousands of non-Croatians, especially Serbs, were moved into Croatia almost as colonists. Throughout Zagreb ancient Croatian homes have been converted to free boarding houses as Croatian families were forced to turn over a room, or perhaps an entire floor to a "proletarian" family; usually non-Croatian. An active campaign was undertaken to bring Croatians into the "Yugoslav" fold. The Croatian ‘language was replaced by "Serbo-Croatian." Famous Croatian newspapers, such as Obzor were closed down, as were dozens of publishing houses. Croatian literary magazines were banned while in Serbia they were encouraged. Serbian historiography was not only revived but allowed to encourage Serbian nationalism. Croatian historiography was discouraged and often forbidden.

The process of centralization was steady and deliberate. The goal was to create a Yugoslav nation of Yugoslav people speaking a Yugoslav language:

all based on the Serbian model. For the Croatians, there were few effective voices of protest from within the country. The Second World War, Bleiburg and the post-war massacres, and the massive wave of emigration had virtually stripped Croatia of an entire generation.

The Spanish branch of the Ustashe, by far the most militant, was headed by former Ustashe Colonel (and General of the Croatian Army), Vjekoslav Luburic who had gained a fierce reputation during the Second World War as head of Croatian prisons and concentration camps. At war's end he headed the "Obrana" forces which fought delaying actions at the rear of the retreating Croatian Army. During the immediate post-war period, his group was connected with the "Crusaders" who fought on as guerillas well into the 1950s. Luburic published a magazine, Drina and a newspaper Obrana, which called for armed revolt in Croatia and often included instructions on such matters as the manufacture of bombs and military tactics. There were, during the 1950s and early 1960s, a number of "guerrilla" actions inside Yugoslavia. To what extent these were controlled by Luburic will never be known. He was bludgeoned to death on Croatian Independence Day in 1969 by Ilija Stanic of the Yugoslav Secret Police.

The United States and Canada, the principal home of Croatian exiles during the post-war period, saw the formation of new political powers based on a blending of the Peasant movement, the Ustase movement, and the North American ideal of republican government. Through publications and education, the American and Canadian Croatians became the true spokesmen for the Croatian exile community. It can also be said that with the possible exception of Croatian Muslims who went to the Middle East after the war, no group of Croatians assimilated as did those of North America. While maintaining their ethnic identity and the hope for a free Croatia, many found the American way of life worthwhile and rewarding. Thousands became Canadian and American citizens and many, in a period of ten or fifteen years, were leaders in education, business, and industry all over North America.

On July 1, 1966 Alexander Rankovic, leading Serbian communist, second in command to Tito and chief of the Secret Police was purged. The ouster took place at the Fourth Plenum meeting of the Central Committee at Tito's luxury retreat on the island of Brioni. His dismissal came as a shock to both the communist and non-communist world and as a great relief to most citizens of Yugoslavia, Croatian or otherwise. As part of the cleansing process, it was publicly announced for the first time that the UDBA held files on one million three hundred thousand Croatians: every fifth person in Croatia. It was found that the movements of Croatians all over the world were watched and recorded by the Secret Police, a fact well known to most Croatian emigres. And, at last it was noted why Rankovic had really been removed from office. He had tapped Tito's telephones, his home, and even his bedroom.

Almost immediately after the purge, the leadership of the League of Communists of Croatia began to move toward implementation of rights and privileges guaranteed by the constitution of Yugoslavia. Both the communist and non-communist leaders had visions of a strong Croatian Republic within Yugoslavia based on the existing self-management program. Communist leaders included Mika Tripalo, Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, and virtually the entire membership of the Central Committee. These leaders, joined by the leading writers and intellectuals of Croatia brought about a new era in Croatia that has come to be known as the "Croatian Spring." Communist leaders spoke to mass rallies stressing the national and ethnic identity of the Croatian people. New newspapers sprang up almost overnight. Literary publications were being produced in great numbers and some began to refer to the new liberalization as a "national revival" or "renaisance."

One of the first problems to be dealt with was basic to the entire question of Croatian nationalism---that of language. In 1954 at Novi Sad a number of leading Croatian and Serbian philologists stated clearly that while the Croatian and Serbian languages had a common linguistic base, they were expressions of the history, culture and national identity of the two peoples and that they should remain as such. This agreement was meant to put to rest once and for all the so-called "Serbo-Croatian" language. That agreement was ignored by the government as both print and electronic journalism continued to use "Serbo-Croatian" as did the post office, the telephone service and the railways. In addition, the army and almost the entire government operated either in "Serbo-Croatian" or outright Serbian.

On March 15, 1967 a "Declaration Concerning the Name and the Position of the Croatian Literary Language" appeared in Zagreb. It bore the signatures of 140 leading Croatian writers, linguists and intellectuals representing nineteen of the most scholarly institutions and cultural organizations in Croatia. The declaration called for two things. First, it called for the true equality of four literary languages in Yugoslavia, the Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian and Macedonian, and the publication of all federal laws and acts in each of the four languages. Second, it demanded the use of the Croatian standard language in schools and all mass communication media in the Republic of Croatia. Over half of the signers were members of the League of Communists of Croatia. By April 7, nine had been expelled, 13 had been given final warnings and one, Miroslav Krleza, resigned from the Central Committee of the Party. On April 19, 1967, the Croatian Academy of America, usually known for its nonpartisanship, issued a statement supporting the Zagreb declaration. This move was later pointed to as proof of "foreign involvement" in Croatian nationalism.

The cool reception given the language delcaration did nothing to stem the tide sweeping Croatia. Croatian writers left the Yugoslav Association of Writers to found their own Association of Croatian Writers. As literature flourished so did historiography. The myth of a "Yugoslav" history was exposed and writers began to explore "their" history which was that of Croatia. The new-found press freedom led to open debate concerning not only language and history but, most important, the economy.

Croatians pointed out that Croatia turned over ninety per cent of her hard currency earnings to the central government in Belgrade, keeping only ten per cent for capital expansion or investment. While employment rose by 258,000 in Serbia between 1961 and 1970, the figure in Croatia was only 114,000. In the meanwhile, thousands of Croatians were forced to work in western Europe and send money home to support their families.

Freedom of the press and of assembly had proved to be dangerous in the hands of the masses. Such freedoms led to questions and debates which could in turn lead to change. Change is not popular in a dictatorship, especially that change which does not come from the top down.

The Student Strike and the End of the Croatian Spring

In the forefront of the liberalization of the Croatian Spring were the communist and non-communist students of the University of Zagreb. The student body of the Croatian University, as the union of several universities is now called, had established a tradition of opposition to foreign rule going back to strikes and riots during the rule of the pro-Hungarian Ban Khuen-Hedervary during the nineteenth century. During the period of royalist Yugoslavia from 1918 to1941, the Croatian students again proved themselves to be a primary catalyst for political change. In June 1968 there was turmoil and unrest on the campus but little happened to change the Yugoslav order. The true turning point was in January 1970 when the Central Committee of the Croatian League of Communists leadership was taken over by pro-Croatian, (as opposed to pro-unitarist), members. In December of that year Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, a non-communist philosophy student was elected to the post of pro-rector (student dean) of the university. In doing so, he defeated the official party candidate for this office and caused a conflict on the campus between the growing number of pro-Croatian students and the ever shrinking number of communists. Within weeks, the Croatian students had replaced unitarists on the staff of Studentski List, the Croatian student newspaper and in a number of student organizations. Unlike some actions of students in American colleges, those of the Croatians were not isolated from the mainstream of life but rather reflected the changes taking place throughout the country and especially within the leadership of the League of Communists.

The spring of 1971 saw speeches, rallies and proclamations as students and workers joined to support the demands of the new party leadership. One such rally held in Zagreb drew 300,000 people demanding the passage of twenty-two amendments to the federal constitution transferring more sovereignty to the republics and allowing for greater economic freedom. The amendments were passed on July 1, 1971. Jubilation over the victory was ended by summer vacation which began in mid-July. As soon as the majority of the students had left for their homes in the provinces, the unitarists ousted two popular professors of economics from the party. A new wave of outrage was heard from the Croatian students and many threatened to withdraw their support of the liberal party leadership. It soon became apparent that great pressure had been brought to bear by Tito to purge the economists as a means of quieting the Serbian leadership.

Tito visited Zagreb in September to judge for himself the depth of Croatian nationalism in the region. He invited the non-communist student prorector to attend a reception at the finest hotel in Croatia. Cicak refused. Tito then ordered the president of the University to fire Cicak. The president refused. Despite this cool reception, Tito went on to the industrial town of Varazdin where he promised to act on the Croatian demands and end the economic exploitation of the Croatian people.

Many of the students were unimpressed by such promises which had been made by every Yugoslav government since 1918. The most radical students, not taken seriously by the Croatian party leadership, demanded a semi-autonomous Croatian state with its own seat in the United Nations and control over military forces stationed on Croatian soil. At about the same time the central government announced that it would dissolve the committee set up to reform the foreign exchange system, a major point of contention for the Croatians. The Croatian Sabor (Parliament) had passed a resolution calling upon the federal government to establish a system of foreign exchange reform which would allow Croatia to keep twenty-five per cent of her own foreign earnings. At that time SR Croatia, with twenty-two per cent of the total population of Yugoslavia, accounted for forty per cent of the foreign exchange and was allowed to keep about five per cent of the total.

When it became known that the government would again ignore the wishes of the Croatian people as expressed by their elected leaders and continue economic exploitation of the Republic, a mass rally was held attended by over 3,000 students. A general strike was called to continue until the foreign exchange system was abolished. The most ardent supporters of the strike were communists, including Drazen Budisa, president of the Zagreb League of Students and a Croatian of the Serbian Orthodox faith.

The strike was easily justified through Marxist revolutionary logic and began without incident. Most students knew that they were asking for nothing more than called for by Tito only sixty days before. The party leadership in Croatia did not support the strike but refused to call out the police. The popular weekly VUS endorsed the student demands and workers throughout Croatia supported the strike. Workers who were forced to assemble at the "Rade Koncar" electrical plant to hear a party condemnation of the students interrupted the party speaker and several stood and spoke against the condemnation. Workers at the "Cistoca" factory in Zagreb openly declared their support of the students, sending 200,000 dinars to the students, 100,000 dinars to two student newspapers supporting the strike, and called for the resignation of the head of the Croatian Labor Union, Milutin Baltic.

The strike was called for on Monday, November 22, 1971 and ended on December 3. The first meeting was attended by three thousand students at Zagreb. By November 25 the majority of the students and many of the deans and faculty members of all schools of the University in all cities of Croatia had joined the strikers. With over 30,000 students on strike it had become the largest manifestation of Croatian nationalism since 1945.

Tito gave the opening and closing speeches to the 21st Session of the Presidium on December 1 and 2 calling for the greatest purge since the post-war period. He accused the entire leadership of the Croatian Communists of being "rotten liberals" and called for their removal. Tito called for the complete "cleansing" of the universities, the destruction of the cultural organization Matica Hrvatska, and a purge of the Croatian press. He emphasized that the Constitution, legality or justice were not to be considerations in dealing with the Croatians: "...counterrevolutionary tendencies must be pre-vented by revolutionary activity... This applies both to our administration of justice and state prosecu-tion. They often stick to the laws like ‘a drunk holding on to a fence'. And then the law is turned this way and that and something is always found which acquits the culprit, without considering that which is opposed to socialist development."

For those who wished to follow the Constitution and the principles of justice, Tito gave this warning: "Such people are making it difficult for us to clear up matters and thwart antisocialist elements. Our democracy is being misused too much. I agree that we have the greatest possible democracy. However, steps will be taken against opponents who are working against a democratic community. We must act, in such a way that democratic processes will not be expected for exponents of undemocratic actions against our socialist order. To me, acting in such a way is both democratic and revolutionary. To defend our socialist development from all possible onslaughts we must use all means customary in the present civilized world..." "Those who cannot bear action against counter-re-volutionaries and other elements hostile to the League of Communists should get out."

Following this speech, an extraordinary meeting of the Yugoslav military command was held as special riot police moved from other parts of Yugoslavia toward Zagreb. General Janko Bobetko, a Croatian and high ranking member of the League of Croatian Communists was one of the first to be purged. He was followed by other members of the Territorial Defense and Army. Historian and writer Franjo Tudjman, himself a former general, was arrested. It was clear that before the Croatian nation could be purged, the knife must be clean.

The leadership of the Croatian Communists was given exactly one week to meet all of the demands set forth at Karadjordjevo. They were to report to the Twenty Second Session of the Presidium which was under the chairmanship of Stane Dolanc, former chief of counter-intelligence activities. After a scathing attack on the Croatian people, Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar was allowed to make her presentation as President of the Central Committee of the League of Communists in Croatia. The Presidium found that the actions of the previous seven days, including the suspension of the free press, the closing of Hrvatski Tiednik, the demand for the expulsion of Vlado Veselica from the Socialist Alliance, actions leading to the expulsion of all members of the Faculty of Law who had supported the student strike, annulment of admission for all students who had "behaved in a chauvinist manner," and extralegal actions against student organizations and trade unions which had supported the strike, were not sufficient signs of progress. The heads of a few students and workers could not atone for the sin of pretending equality in the classless state.

Purge

On Sunday morning, December 12, 1971, Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, President of the Central Committee of the Croatian Communists, resigned. At the same moment Pero Pirker, Secretary of the Central Committee announced his resignation. Miko Tripalo, one of Croatia's two representatives to the 15-member "Presidency" of Yugoslavia, followed suit that afternoon. It was soon announced that the president of the party for the city of Zagreb had resigned the day before.

We are afraid that what will follow now, will be similar to the fate of Czechoslovakia. We are now expecting reprisals and persecutions...but we are sure that the march of history cannot be stopped."